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Abstract 
In the run-up to the elections to the European Parliament in 2014, EU citizens had the unprecedented opportunity to 
watch televised debates between the candidates running for president of the European Commission. The most im-
portant debate was the so-called “Eurovision debate”, which was broadcasted in almost all EU member states. In this 
study we explore the responses of a sample of 110 young German voters, who watched this debate, to the candidates’ 
messages and whether exposure to the debate caused a shift in the respondents’ attitudes towards the EU. Combining 
data from a quasi-experiment, real-time response data, and data from a content analysis of the debate, we find that re-
spondents’ reactions to the candidates’ statements were—on average—positive and that some respondents displayed 
attitudinal changes resulting in more favorable views towards the EU. Although the direct connection between real-
time responses and post-debate attitudes is not as strong as expected, most of the measured effects indicate that a 
positive evaluation of the candidates’ messages usually results in more pro-European attitudes. Furthermore, we find 
no strong evidence that political knowledge moderates debate effects. In general, differences between political ‘novic-
es’ and political ‘experts’ tend to be rare. 
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1. Introduction 
In the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament (EP) 
elections, the candidates running for the office of pres-
ident of the European Commission participated in sev-
eral televised pan-European debates, a novelty in the 
EU’s history. Among the series of debates, the so-called 
“Eurovision debate”, which was held on May 15th 2014, 
stood out as the single most important debate. In con-
trast to all other debates, this event was not only 
broadcasted in the vast majority of EU member states, 
it also featured the five major candidates running for 
president of the European Commission (for an over-
view see Maier & Faas, 2014b). For the first time in the 
EU’s history, an overwhelming majority of EU citizens 
thus had an unprecedented opportunity: they could di-
rectly compare the candidate’s positions and personali-
ties in a televised debate, a well-known campaign for-
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mat in the context of national elections and where it 
has turned out be a powerful campaigning tool in the 
run-up to elections. 
There is a large body of literature on the impact of 
televised debates in national elections (for an overview 
see, e.g., McKinney & Carlin, 2004). This research has 
demonstrated that debates can have—among other 
things—effects on prospective voters’ cognitive and 
political involvement, attitudes towards candidates and 
issues, turnout, and voting behavior. In this contribu-
tion, we focus on the influence of debates on political 
attitudes towards candidates and issues, the impact of 
which is heavily disputed in the literature. While a me-
ta-analysis by Benoit, Hansen, and Verser (2003) indi-
cates that viewing televised debates can affect issue 
preferences and attitudes respondents hold towards 
the candidates (see also, e.g., Abramowitz, 1978; Geer, 
1988; Lanoue & Schrott, 1989a, 1989b), most studies 
on debates in the U.S. suggest that debates reinforce 
already existing attitudes rather than transforming 
them (see, e.g., Chaffee, 1978; Hagner & Rieselbach, 
1978; Katz & Feldman, 1962; Kraus, 2000; McKinney & 
Carlin, 2004). These findings are in line with the results 
from classical campaign research that the reinforce-
ment of attitudes is the most important campaign ef-
fect. Mechanisms of selective exposure and selective 
information processing usually prevent individuals 
from receiving ‘wrong’ information, i.e. information 
contradicting their views, and thus, from changing their 
attitudes (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944). For 
Germany, it has been demonstrated that—at least in 
the short run—a significant part of the electorate 
changed their opinions about the respective candidates 
running for chancellor after watching a debate (for a 
summary see, e.g., Maier, Faas, & Maier, 2014). It has 
been argued that selective information processing is 
rendered more difficult in the case of televised debates 
than for other types of campaign messages. Empirical-
ly, is has been shown that televised debates make it 
more difficult for recipients to permanently block mes-
sages from the political opponent. Hence, candidates 
have not only the opportunity to “preach to the con-
verted” (Norris, 2003) but also to influence independ-
ent voters as well as supporters of the political oppo-
nent (Faas & Maier, 2004; Maier & Faas, 2011). With 
respect to the Eurovision debate, research indicates 
that exposure to campaign messages also affects can-
didate evaluations. Most of the candidates for Com-
mission president were perceived more favorably after 
watching the debate (Dinter & Weissenbach, 2015). 
Since the early days of research on the effects of 
campaign communication, it has been claimed that 
voters lacking political knowledge and political interest 
are most likely to be persuaded by campaign messages 
(see, e.g., Lazarsfeld et al., 1944). This implies, in turn, 
that voters’ level of political involvement is a factor 
that moderates the impact of new information on po-
litical attitudes and behavior. The reason for this rela-
tionship is that voters with a higher level of cognitive 
and political involvement are more likely to hold strong 
attitudes towards politics (see, e.g., McGraw & Ling, 
2003). Moreover, a higher level of knowledge about 
politics enables voters to create counterarguments to 
protect themselves against persuasive messages (see, 
e.g., Matthes & Marquard, 2013; Reinemann & Maurer, 
2010). Hence, new information will not change their at-
titudes as easily as is the case for voters displaying low 
levels of political involvement (Iyengar, Peters, Kinder, 
& Krosnick, 1984; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). In turn, it 
has been argued that with increasing levels of political 
knowledge the likelihood of attitudinal changes also 
rises. Individuals with higher levels of cognitive abilities 
are able to process a message more profoundly (see, 
e.g., Delli Carpini, & Keeter, 1996; Krosnick & Brannon, 
1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Zaller, 1992). This is par-
ticularly important if a message includes complex in-
formation (which is true for most information about 
politics in general, and should particularly apply to the 
multi-level character of EU politics). As a consequence, 
voters who do not possess the required knowledge to 
properly process relevant political information are 
more likely to brush the message aside. In contrast, 
voters with political expertise tend to think more care-
fully about political information and the likelihood to 
be affected by information thus increases (Hwang, 
Gotlieb, Nah, & McLeod, 2007). 
Evidence that campaign information—or, more 
generally, information provided by the mass media—
has such a conditional impact on attitudes is, however, 
mixed. While some studies find that campaign or me-
dia effects are stronger for voters with low levels of po-
litical involvement (e.g., Hwang et al., 2007; Kinder & 
Sanders, 1990; Matthes & Marquard, 2013), other stud-
ies find no effect or even the opposite relationship (e.g., 
Krosnick & Brannon, 1993; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 
1997; Young, 2004). 
This inconclusive pattern also appears to be charac-
teristic of EP election campaigns, most notably with re-
gard to media effects on EU attitudes and behavior. 
With respect to political attitudes, Schuck and de 
Vreese (2006) demonstrated that the impact of media 
frames on public support for EU enlargement is mod-
erated by political knowledge. Individuals with low lev-
els of political knowledge were, in general, more af-
fected by news frames than individuals with higher 
knowledge levels. Moreover, they were more suscepti-
ble to risk framing than citizens with high levels of po-
litical knowledge. In addition, Schuck, Boomgaarden 
and de Vreese (2013) showed that citizens who are less 
aware of election campaigns tend to become more 
cynical when consuming news through the media. With 
respect to electoral behavior, Blumler (1983) was able 
to demonstrate for the first EP election that exposure 
to televised campaign information had a particularly 
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positive impact on turnout for voters with a strong in-
terest in the campaign. In contrast, Schönbach (1983) 
found that the impact of the mass media on turnout is 
somewhat stronger for voters with low campaign in-
terest. In addition, Cayrol (1991) indicated that mass 
media information about the 1989 EP election cam-
paign had no impact on voters displaying high levels of 
involvement. For the 1999 election, Schönbach and 
Lauf (2002) found the impact of TV exposure to make 
no difference for involved and uninvolved voters. 
Moreover, their results indicate that newspaper con-
sumption and interpersonal communication mobilized 
the rather less involved voters. Analyzing the 2009 EP 
elections, De Vries, Van der Brug, Van Egmond and Van 
der Eijk (2011) found issue voting to be slightly more 
pronounced among politically sophisticated voters and 
in contexts that provide higher levels of EU-related in-
formation (see also Hobolt, 2005). 
With respect to televised debates, there is very lit-
tle research on the moderating impact of political in-
volvement on debate effects. Druckman (2003) 
demonstrated that citizens with low levels of political 
sophistication exposed to the 1960 Kennedy–Nixon de-
bate learned more than politically sophisticated voters. 
Furthermore, Reinemann and Maurer (2010) showed 
for the 2005 German televised debate that political in-
terest neither affected the perception of the debate 
nor did it moderate the impact of the debate on atti-
tudes towards candidates. 
The differential impact of political involvement on 
the magnitude of campaign effects can be traced back 
to a number of factors (see also Lecheler & de Vreese, 
2011; Lecheler, de Vreese, & Slothuus, 2009). First, 
studies assessing the moderating impact of political in-
volvement differ substantially in their operationalization 
of the concept. Whereas some researchers use 
measures of interest or awareness, others rely on 
measures of knowledge. Although all of these measures 
are positively correlated they tap into different micro-
level processes. Whereas interest and awareness focus 
on motivations, knowledge is about cognitions. Second, 
while standard items to measure political knowledge are 
lacking, scholars largely agree on how to measure the 
motivational aspects of political involvement. Hence, dif-
ferent results on the moderating role of political 
knowledge might by simply a result of different opera-
tionalizations. Third, the impact of political involvement 
might vary with the dependent variable in focus.  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the body of 
research exploring the effects of televised debates. In 
particular, we are interested in how recipients process 
the information provided by the Eurovision debate and 
the impact of watching the debate on EU attitudes. In 
addition, we want to investigate whether political in-
volvement plays a moderating role for the influence of 
such a debate. To this effect, we analyze the relationship 
between debate exposure, debate effects, and political 
involvement for the 2014 Eurovision debate among 
young German voters. Recent research has shown that 
watching this debate affected candidate evaluations and 
attitudes toward the EU (Dinter & Weissenbach, 2015; 
Maier, 2015). Unfortunately, the studies available to 
date did not investigate if the effects of the Eurovision 
debate are similar across different groups of voters. 
Research on EU attitudes of young voters is rela-
tively scarce. Existing studies indicate that young voters 
are usually better informed about the EU (e.g., Maier & 
Bathelt, 2013), tend to hold more pro-European atti-
tudes (e.g., Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & de 
Vreese, 2011), and yet they are less likely to participate 
in EP elections (e.g., Bhatti & Hansen, 2012). It is note-
worthy, though, that there is a general lack of studies 
focusing on the effects of campaign communication on 
this voter segment in general (see, e.g., Kaid, McKin-
ney, & Tedesco, 2007) and with regard to the EU in 
particular (e.g., Esser & de Vreese, 2007). Hence, our 
study contributes to learning about the impact of a ma-
jor campaign message on citizens who had the first op-
portunity to cast their vote at the European level. 
2. Research Design 
On May 15th 2014, seven days before the beginning of 
the election period (May 22nd–25th), the European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU) aired what has become 
known as the “Eurovision Debate”. For a duration of 90 
minutes, the top candidates of the five major political 
groups represented in the EP—Jean-Claude Juncker 
(European People’s Party), Martin Schulz (Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), Guy Verhofstadt 
(Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe), Ska 
Keller (The Greens—European Free Alliance), and Alex-
is Tsipras (European United Left—Nordic Green Left)—
discussed the most pressing problems facing the EU. 
The debate took place in the plenary chamber of the 
EP in Brussels in front of a large audience. 
According to information provided by the EBU, the 
debate was broadcasted in more than 30 countries all 
over the world by 49 TV stations, 10 radio stations, and 
via 39 Internet live streams.1 As Monica Maggioni, one 
of the moderators of the debate, pointed out at the 
beginning of the televised program, the potential reach 
of the debate encompassed 400 million voters. Since 
EP election campaigns differ from country to country, 
the debate can be seen to serve as a common point of 
reference for the entire EU (see also Benoit, 2014, p. 4). 
Against this backdrop, the debate performed poorly. 
                                                          
1 According to the EP, the debate was available on television in 
26 EU member states. In addition, the EP provided a live 
stream on its web site. In Estonia and the Netherlands the de-
bate was available only via Internet. In Denmark and Finland 
the debate was videotaped and broadcasted the next day (see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/divers/broadcasters.pdf) 
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For example, only 160.000 citizens in Germany watched 
the debate (market share: 0.5%),2 which was aired by 
Phoenix TV, a publicly owned news channel. 
In order to capture the effects of the Eurovision de-
bate on young voters, we set up a study totaling 130 
students enrolled at the universities of Koblenz-
Landau, Mainz, and Munich. The impact of the debate 
was measured employing an experimental pretest-
posttest design. The participants watched the debate 
live on large screens in university lecture auditoriums 
or seminar rooms. Immediately before and immediately 
after the debate, the participants were asked to fill in 
detailed questionnaires, which included questions 
about their social profile, political knowledge about the 
EU, attitudes towards politics in general, towards the 
EU and the candidates running for presidency, as well 
as their voting intentions for the upcoming elections. 
We assessed the direct impact of debate exposure by 
comparing pre- and post-debate values of the depend-
ent variables of our analysis (i.e., EU attitudes; for 
wording and coding of all variables see appendix). In 
order to analyze if the debate had conditional effects 
on voters displaying different levels of political in-
volvement, we used political knowledge as a moderator 
variable. This is in line with the results provided by Zaller 
(1992) who has evaluated different measures of political 
awareness, finding that factual knowledge is the best 
measure in this case (see also Converse, 2000; for the 
operationalization of this variable see appendix).3 
                                                          
2 See http://www.quotenmeter.de/n/70768/phoenix-europa 
wahl-erreicht-kaum-zuschauer 
3 As there is no standard scale to measure either political 
Our analysis is based on 110 respondents (Koblenz-
Landau: N=45, Mainz: N=36, Munich: N=29) for whom 
we measured computer-based real-time judgments 
during the course of the debate. The utilized real-time 
response (RTR) system employs the so-called push but-
ton technique. Whenever participants had a favorable or 
unfavorable impression of the debate, they were asked 
to indicate this by pushing the relevant button. Two keys 
were clearly marked on a customary computer key-
board, hence allowing participants to make positive and 
negative judgements independently. The keys corre-
sponded to the design of the computer screen that par-
ticipants had in front of them (see Figure 1). Whenever a 
                                                                                           
knowledge or knowledge about the EU in particular, we cap-
tured political knowledge with three items on factual 
knowledge about the EU. All variables have a sufficient item 
difficulty (M=69.7, minimum 60.9, maximum 74.5). The distri-
bution of our knowledge index is as follows: 7 percent no cor-
rect answer, 21 percent one correct answer, 27 percent two 
correct answers, 45 percent three correct answers. The aver-
age number of correct answers is M=2.1 (SD=1.0). The stand-
ardized reliability (Kuder-Richardson formula 20) of the scale is 
r=.51. Although, reliability is clearly below the cutoff value con-
sidered as adequate by most researchers, Schmitt (1996, pp. 
351-352) argues that even scales with reliability scores as low 
as in our case might be useful “when a measure has other de-
sirable properties such as meaningful content coverage of 
some domain and reasonable unidimensionality”. Both criteria 
are met here: first, a factor analysis yields only one dimension. 
Hence, our scale is homogenous. Second, as the wording of our 
knowledge items indicate, all of them refer to the EU. In addi-
tion, all items are positively correlated (mean inter-item corre-
lation .26; minimum: .16, maximum: .41). All items of the scale 
are thus related in a meaningful way to the domain in focus. 
 
Figure 1. RTR screen. 
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participant decide to strike one of the keys, the respec-
tive symbol on the screen flashed up to confirm the 
stroke. The RTR-system yields categorical data about 
positive and negative impressions of the debate on a 
second-by-second base. Previous research indicates 
that the RTR data is reliable and valid (see, e.g., Maier, 
Maurer, Reinemann, & Faas, 2007). 
In order to connect real-time responses with the 
content of the debate, we carried out a content analy-
sis of the Eurovision debate. Based on the German 
transcript of the debate (Maier & Faas, 2014a; for an 
English transcript see Maier & Faas, 2014b), we first 
disaggregated the debate content into single state-
ments. These single statements are our unit of analysis. 
A statement is considered to be complete if the speak-
er, the content, the object, or the strategy changed. In 
order to match the content of the statements with re-
cipients’ real-time responses we identified the exact 
beginning as well as the exact end of each message. 
Second, we separated functional from non-functional 
units. Non-functional units are statements that were in-
complete, i.e. that they were not intelligible. Third, all 
functional units addressed by candidates were coded 
(e.g., the topic of the statement). For the purpose of our 
analysis we only employ information about which candi-
date was speaking at a particular point of the debate. 
Our student sample is, of course, a convenience 
sample. Although research has indicated that there is 
nothing wrong with student samples in experimental 
research per se (Druckman & Kam, 2009), we have to 
acknowledge that the distribution of some of the items 
used in our analysis might be biased due to the struc-
ture of the sample (for instance, assessments about 
the most pressing problems Germany is facing). Never-
theless, as the focus of our study is on campaign ef-
fects, this kind of bias should not be a problem. Most 
of the respondents are students of political or social 
science study programs (79%). 56 percent of the partic-
ipants are female. The average age is 22.0 years 
(SD=2.9). Based on a self-placement on an eleven-point 
ideology scale from 0 (“left”) to 10 (“right”) our sample 
is slightly biased to the left (M=3.7, SD=1.6). In addi-
tion, the participants of our study view the EU favora-
bly: prior to the debate, 84 percent viewed Germany’s 
membership in the EU as a “good thing”, 16 percent 
believed that being part of the EU is “neither good nor 
bad” for Germany, and only one percent indicated that 
Germany’s EU membership is a “bad thing”.4 
                                                          
4 Our sample is neither representative for Germany nor for 
young voters. Nevertheless, we have no indication that the 
processing of the debate and its effects are different for voters 
not included in our sample. Because we are interested in the 
effect of the debate (and not in distributions of EU attitudes), 
we assume that our findings are valid for young and well-
educated German voters in general. 
3. Results 
3.1. Perception of the Candidates’ Statements 
To assess the individual perception of the candidates’ 
statements we make use of the data obtained through 
RTR measurement. In total, we received 29,746 real-
time responses during the debate. 24,619 (82.8 per-
cent) of these responses were direct reactions to the 
candidates speaking. On average, every participant ex-
ercised a key-stroke 223.8 times during the debate.5 
Since the duration of the debate was 5,380 seconds, 
recipients reacted to what the candidates said by push-
ing one of the keys about every 24 seconds. The majori-
ty of reactions to the candidates were positive (16,542, 
i.e. 67.2 percent). Voters with low and high levels of po-
litical knowledge differed somewhat but not significantly 
(p>.05). On average, political ‘novices’ stroke a key 196.9 
times (i.e. about every 27 seconds). Political ‘experts’ re-
acted, on average, 234.4 times to what the candidates 
had to say (i.e. about every 23 seconds). In addition, 
the share of positive responses is quite similar as well 
(65.6 vs. 67.6 percent, p>.05). With respect to the can-
didates, Keller received most of the spontaneous re-
sponses (6,501, i.e. 26.4 percent), followed by Verhof-
stadt (5,487, i.e. 22.3 percent), Juncker (4,916, i.e. 20.0 
percent), Tsipras (4,193, i.e. 17.0 percent), and Schulz 
(3,522, i.e. 14.3 percent). This ranking is similar for re-
spondents with low and high knowledge levels. 
In order to keep our research as transparent and 
comprehensible as possible, we draw on the individual 
balance between a candidate’s share of positive and 
his/her share of negative reactions for all subsequent 
analyses (for this approach see also Faas & Maier, 
2004). Based on this measure, a score of +100 (-100) 
indicates that a respondent’s reaction towards a candi-
date is exclusively positive (negative). A score of 0 indi-
cates that positive and negative reactions are in bal-
ance, or that a candidate received no response at all. 
Using this measure, Table 1 indicates that Keller (+73.1) 
and Schulz (+71.9) are clearly ahead of Verhofstadt 
(+39.6) and Juncker (+34.2). Tsipras obtained the 
worst, albeit still positive balance (+10.7). 
If we disaggregate the evaluation of the candidates’ 
debate performance by issue block, it becomes apparent 
that the candidates performed very differently during 
the course of the debate (see Table 2). Juncker received 
most support when he talked about the acceptance of 
religious symbols in Europe (+50.2) and about the refu-
gee issue (+48.9). He performed worst when he ex-
plained measures to overcome Euroskepticism (-2.3). 
Schulz had his best moments when he outlined his plans 
                                                          
5 Note that there is a large variation for the number of individ-
ual responses to the candidates. The minimum number of re-
actions is 14, the maximum number is 2,036. The standard de-
viation is 305.2. 
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Table 1. Mean balance between the share of positive and negative real-time responses to candidate statements by 
candidate and topic. 
 Juncker Schulz Verhofstadt Keller Tsipras 
Debate as a whole +34.2 +71.9 +39.6 +73.1 +10.7 
Blocks of issues      
Opening statement +17.0 +4.3 +9.2 +59.9 -9.1 
Youth unemployment +38.9 +62.9 +42.1 +62.5 -1.8 
Austerity +20.4 +38.5 -23.4 +57.5 -20.8 
Regulations of banks +31.2 +35.5 +15.0 +54.6 -1.6 
Euroskepticism -2.3 +48.9 +18.6 +54.9 -12.8 
Ukraine crisis +37.8 +60.9 +40.8 +73.7 +37.0 
Independent movements +39.1 +50.4 +18.6 +39.5 +25.1 
Refugees +48.9 +43.6 +48.9 +69.1 +21.2 
Religious symbols +50.2 +49.4 +55.0 +66.2 +37.6 
Turnout +25.6 +65.1 +22.9 +56.9 +4.9 
Lobbyism and corruption +29.7 +48.6 +71.5 +55.9 +24.6 
President of EU commission +24.5 +41.4 +11.2 +29.8 -1.4 
Closing statements +28.2 +52.7 +23.7 +33.2 +13.2 
N 110 
Table 2. Mean balance between the share of positive and negative real-time responses to candidate statements by 
candidate and topic by voters with low and high level of political knowledge. 
 Low knowledge  High knowledge 
 Juncker Schulz Verhof-
stadt 
Keller Tsipras  Juncker Schulz Verhof-
stadt 
Keller Tsipras 
Debate as a whole +44.7 +61.4 +42.0 +74.2 +6.3  +30.1 +76.0 +38.7 +72.6 +12.4 
Blocks of issues            
Opening statement +34.1 +3.2 +19.4 +61.3 -24.7  +10.3 +4.7 +5.1 +59.3 -3.0 
Youth unemployment +48.0 +61.5 +46.0 +61.3 +9.7  +35.4 +63.5 +40.5 +63.0 -6.3 
Austerity +19.4 +34.0 -7.0 +60.8 -10.6  +20.8 +40.3 -29.9 +56.2 -24.9 
Regulations of banks +44.8 +9.7b +16.1 +50.0 -5.0  +25.9 +45.7 +14.6 +56.4 -0.3 
Euroskepticism +8.5 +27.4a +16.7 +52.7 -9.6  -6.6 +57.4 +19.4 +55.7 -14.0 
Ukraine crisis +33.5 +51.0 +20.2 +79.6 +32.6  +39.5 +64.8 +48.9 +71.4 +38.7 
Independent movements +32.3 +44.5 +37.9 +32.3 +17.4  +41.8 +52.7 +11.2 +42.3 +28.2 
Refugees +45.2 +35.5 +51.6 +64.5 +14.8  +50.3 +46.8 +47.9 +70.9 +23.7 
Religious symbols +64.5 +30.1a +49.7 +70.9 +28.7  +44.6 +56.9 +57.1 +64.4 +41.1 
Turnout +27.6 +67.6 +0.3a +65.9 -2.2  +24.7 +64.1 +31.8 +53.4 +7.6 
Lobbyism and corruption +30.1 +28.0a +68.8 +58.6 +16.1  +29.5 +56.6 +72.5 +54.8 +27.9 
President of EU commission +16.1 +40.3 +12.6 +9.7a +6.5  +27.8 +41.8 +10.7 +37.6 +0.6 
Closing statements +38.7 +23.2c +21.0 +25.8 +20.4  +24.1 +64.3 +24.8 +36.1 +10.3 
N 31  79 
Note: a: p<.05, b: p<.01, c: p<.001. 
to confront the low turnout in EP elections (+65.1), to 
reduce youth unemployment (62.9), and when he high-
lighted his position on the Ukraine crisis (+60.9). His 
weakest performance was during his opening state-
ment (+4.3). Verhofstadt performed best when ad-
dressing lobbyism and corruption (+71.5). He was 
judged least favorably when he talked about austerity 
(-23.4). Keller performed very strong during all phases 
of the debate. She obtained her best scores with her 
position on the Ukraine crisis (73.7), and was deemed 
least convincing when she talked about the future role 
of the presidency of the European Commission (+29.8), 
as well as during her closing statement (+33.2). For 
Tsipras the picture was more mixed than for the other 
candidates. While his arguments on religion (+37.6) 
and the Ukraine crisis (+37.0) were received favorably, 
he faced negative responses on several issues: His posi-
tion on austerity (-20.8) and his explanation about why 
the EU is often seen critically by citizens (-12.9) were 
the most unpopular. If we compare the perceived per-
formance of the candidates across issues, Keller per-
formed most successfully. She ‘won’ in seven out of 
thirteen issue blocks, including the opening statement. 
Schulz received the best ratings on five issues, includ-
ing the closing statement. Verhofstadt performed best 
on one issue (lobbyism and corruption), while Tsipras 
and Juncker did not ‘win’ any of the thematic blocks.  
How successful was the perceived performance of 
the candidates with respect to the recipients’ level of 
political knowledge about the EU? Our results indicate 
that both groups of voters—those with high and low 
knowledge levels—reacted quite similarly to the candi-
dates’ statements (see Table 2). Focusing on the de-
bate as a whole, we do not find any significant differ-
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ences between ‘experts’ and ‘novices’ (p>.05). If we 
analyze the reactions to the candidates by issue blocks 
we find some statistically significant differences 
(p<.05), albeit only for Schulz, Verhofstadt and Keller. 
All of these differences point in the same direction: re-
spondents with a high level of political knowledge were 
more impressed by the candidate statements than less 
knowledgeable voters. If we add gender, ideology, and 
diffuse support for the EU as control variables, four 
group differences remain significant (p<.05). On the 
one hand, Schulz was able to convince ‘experts’ more 
than ‘novices’ when he talked about Euroskepticism, 
lobbyism and corruption, as well as during his closing 
statement. On the other hand, subjects with a high 
level of political knowledge showed more support for 
Verhofstadt on the issue of turnout than voters with 
lower levels of factual knowledge. 
In sum, the candidates left more positive than neg-
ative impressions among our audience of students. The 
real-time reactions of recipients with a low level of po-
litical knowledge and those of political ‘experts’ differ 
only for some candidates and for some issues. After 
controlling for variables, which potentially explain the 
differences between these two groups of voters, it 
turns out that only a few of the original effects remain 
significant. Interestingly enough, our results indicate 
that respondents with higher levels of political 
knowledge tend to be more persuaded by the candi-
dates than those with lower levels of knowledge. 
3.2. Impact of the Debate on Political Attitudes 
One of our most important findings is that exposure to 
the Eurovision debate led to only minor attitudinal 
changes (see Table 3). Overall, we observe only two 
changes reaching conventional significance levels 
(p<.05). First, watching the debate causes an increasing 
willingness among respondents to favor further Euro-
pean integration (+.35 scale points). Second, exposure 
to the debate leads to a decrease in fear associated 
with the EU (-.25 scale points). In addition, three atti-
tude changes almost reached statistical significance. 
First, expectations about the development of the 
economy in the EU are more optimistic after the de-
bate than before (+.11 scale points, p=.052). Second, 
prior to the debate, the participants of our study be-
lieved that the economic situation in Germany is better 
than the EU’s. After watching the debate, this ‘national 
advantage’ is reduced by -.10 scale points (p=.055). 
Third, the share of subjects who believe that the most 
appropriate level to solve the most important prob-
lems facing Germany is the European level increased by 
8.2 percentage points (p=.060). 
If we compare the impact of the debate for re-
spondents with high and low levels of political 
knowledge, we find different effects among these 
groups for two out of sixteen issue blocks (see Table 4). 
First, the perception that the EU is the most appropri-
ate arena to solve Germany’s problems changed only 
moderately for participants with a high level of EU-
related knowledge (+2.5 percentage points). However, 
watching the debate increased the perception that the 
EU is an effective problem solver for political ‘novices’ 
(+22.6 percentage points). The difference between the 
two groups is statistically significant (p<.05). Second, for 
respondents with a low level of political knowledge, 
the belief that the EU is responsible for the economic 
situation in Germany has solidified as a result of watch-
ing the debate (+.46). In contrast, respondents with a 
high level of knowledge about the EU tend to believe 
that the EU bears less responsibility for the state of the 
national economy after the debate than before (-.34). 
These results indicate that political ‘novices’ and politi-
cal ‘experts’ draw very different conclusions from the  
Table 3. Impact of debate exposure on political attitudes. 
 Before the debate After the debate Difference 
% EU most appropriate level to solve most pressing problem 62.7 70.9 +8.2 
Development of economic situation of the EU -0.23 -0.26 -0.04 
Expected development of economic situation of the EU 0.24 0.35 +0.11 
Comparison of the economic situation in Germany and the EU 1.46 1.36 -0.10 
Responsibility of EU for economic situation in Germany 6.64 6.53 -0.11 
Financial support of suffering member states 3.11 3.15 +0.04 
Trust EU 0.27 0.35 +0.07 
Trust European Commission 0.11 0.13 +0.02 
EU good thing 0.83 0.85 +0.02 
Further integration 1.75 2.10 +0.35a 
EU: Fear -1.64 -1.89 -0.25a 
EU: Anger -1.34 -1.51 -0.19 
EU: Hope 0.64 0.84 +0.20 
EU: Joy -0.30 -0.04 +0.25 
EU: Disgust -1.94 -1.99 -0.05 
EU: Contempt -0.73 -0.70 +0.03 
N 110 110 110 
Notes: Except for the first row all values are means; a: p<.05, b: p<.01, c: p<.001. 
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Table 4. Impact of debate reception on political attitudes by political knowledge level. 
 Low knowledge  High knowledge Difference 
 Before the 
debate 
After the 
debate 
Differ-
ence 
 Before the 
debate 
After the 
debate 
Differ-
ence 
low/high 
knowledge 
% EU most appropriate level to solve most pressing problem 54.8 77.4 +22.6a  65.8 68.4 +2.5 +20.0a 
Development of economic situation of the EU -0.03 -0.16 -0.13  -0.30 -0.30 0.00 -0.13 
Expected development of economic situation of the EU 0.26 0.29 +0.03  0.23 0.38 +0.15a -0.12 
Comparison of the economic situation in Germany and the EU 1.35 1.16 -0.19  1.51 1.44 -0.06 -0.13 
Responsibility of EU for economic situation in Germany 6.35 6.80 +0.46  6.76 6.42 -0.34a +0.80a 
Financial support of suffering member states 3.07 3.13 +0.06  3.13 3.15 +0.02 0.04 
Trust EU 0.13 0.29 +0.16  0.33 0.37 +0.04 +0.12 
Trust European Commission -0.06 0.03 +0.10  0.18 0.16 -0.01 +0.11 
EU good thing 0.74 0.77 +0.03  0.86 0.87 +0.01 +0.02 
Further integration 1.63 2.07 +0.44  1.79 2.11 +0.32a +0.12 
EU: Fear -1.84 -2.00 -0.16  -1.57 -1.85 -0.29a +0.12 
EU: Anger -1.32 -1.23 +0.10  -1.34 -1.65 -0.30 +0.40 
EU: Hope 0.29 0.81 +0.52  0.77 0.85 +0.08 +0.44 
EU: Joy -0.65 -0.48 +0.16  -0.16 0.13 +0.29 -0.13 
EU: Disgust -1.84 -2.06 -0.23  -1.97 -1.96 +0.01 -0.24 
EU Contempt -0.48 -0.42 +0.06  -0.82 -0.81 +0.01 +0.05 
N 31  79 110 
Notes: Except for the first row all values are means; a: p<.05, b: p<.01, c: p<.001. 
debate (p<.05). For both issues, the impact of political 
knowledge on attitude change remains significant after 
controlling for gender, ideology, and diffuse support for 
the EU (p<.05). Moreover, a third variable turns out to 
be significantly influenced by different knowledge levels: 
Exposure to the debate causes ‘experts’ to see the EU as 
less threatening than political ‘novices’ (p<.05). 
In sum, watching the Eurovision debate created—at 
least in part—more favorable impressions about the 
EU among young and well-educated German voters. 
Differences between political ‘experts’ and ‘novices’ 
are a rare occurrence. In addition, we see no clear pic-
ture whether subjects with a low level of political 
knowledge or participants with a high level of 
knowledge are more influenced by watching the de-
bate. In one case (responsibility of the EU for the eco-
nomic situation in Germany), the reactions of the two 
groups of voters even move in different directions. 
3.3. Impact of the Evaluation of the Candidates’ Debate 
Performance on Political Attitudes 
Thus far, our results indicate that exposure to the de-
bate caused a shift in a subset of relevant EU attitudes. 
In addition, the subjects of our study reacted sponta-
neously to the statements of the candidates because 
they picked up pieces of information from the debate, 
which made them reconsider their positions towards 
the EU. As a consequence, we expect that the content 
of the debate had an impact on individual EU attitudes. 
In order to analyze the impact of real-time responses 
on post-debate attitudes we present a regression 
model including the evaluation of the debate perfor-
mance for each of the five candidates. In addition, we 
include the respective post-debate attitude, gender, 
and ideology as control variables. 
Our results indicate that the explanatory power of the 
response to the candidates’ messages for post-debate 
attitudes—i.e. the increase of R2 when adding the con-
trol variables first and the RTR values for the candi-
dates last—tends to be rather small, with R2 varying be-
tween .8 and 11.8 (see Table 5). Since the R2 for the full 
model ranges between R2=25.9 and R2=70.5, the ex-
planatory power of the candidate statements is rather 
modest. A closer look at the model reveals that only 
few of the candidate variables have a statistically sig-
nificant impact on post-debate attitudes. First, support 
for Juncker increases the perception among respondents 
that the EU is the most appropriate level to solve the 
most pressing national problems. This relationship is re-
versed for Schulz. Second, support for the messages 
voiced by Verhofstadt increases the willingness to finan-
cially support member states suffering from the eco-
nomic crisis. Third, trust in the EU increases if subjects 
had a positive impression of the statements by Verhof-
stadt, Keller, and Tsipras. Fourth, support for the mes-
sages by Keller fosters trust in the European Commis-
sion. Fifth, a positive evaluation of Schulz’s statements 
reduces associations of hope with the EU, while sympa-
thy for the statements by Verhofstadt decreases associa-
tions of joy as well as of disgust with the EU. 
To answer the question of whether there is a condi-
tional impact of the evaluation of the candidates’ state-
ments on post-debate attitudes, we finally analyze the 
minimum R2 of these variables for each of our depend-
ent variables for political ‘novices’ and political ‘ex-
perts’.6 Our results indicate that the explanatory power  
                                                          
6 Due to small N for voters with a low level of political 
knowledge we do not discuss the regression coefficients. 
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Table 5. Impact of real-time responses to candidate statements on post-debate political attitudes. 
 R2 Min. R2 
candidate 
statements 
Juncker Schulz Verhof-
stadt 
Keller Tsipras 
% EU most appropriate level to solve most pressing problem 0.362 0.067 0.218a -0.218a 0.067 0.056 0.150 
Development of economic situation of the EU 0.538 0.020 -0.047 -0.053 -0.051 -0.014 -0.114 
Expected development of economic situation of the EU 0.555 0.017 0.133 -0.010 -0.068 -0.018 0.102 
Comparison of the economic situation in Germany and the EU 0.432 0.021 0.040 -0.049 -0.072 0.169 -0.062 
Responsibility of EU for economic situation in Germany 0.485 0.008 0.048 -0.065 -0.012 0.090 0.011 
Financial support of suffering member states 0.536 0.047 -0.050 -0.053 0.163a 0.146 -0.112 
Trust EU 0.570 0.118 0.074 -0.072 0.208b 0.210b 0.162a 
Trust European Commission 0.479 0.057 0.113 -0.040 0.027 0.233b 0.040 
EU good thing 0.705 0.003 0.054 0.008 -0.047 0.032 -0.027 
Further integration 0.644 0.005 -0.005 0.014 0.015 0.069 -0.007 
EU: Fear 0.526 0.019 0.084 0.005 -0.153 0.068 -0.053 
EU: Anger 0.377 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.109 -0.064 -0.040 
EU: Hope 0.259 0.057 0.092 -0.209a -0.076 0.187 0.051 
EU: Joy 0.420 0.043 0.090 0.030 -0.229a 0.075 0.041 
EU: Disgust 0.587 0.026 0.020 -0.007 -0.169a 0.077 -0.081 
EU: Contempt 0.368 0.051 -0.030 0.020 -0.133 0.063 -0.241 
N 110 
Notes: All models control for pretest value of the dependent variable, ideology, and gender. Displayed are standardized 
regression coefficients; a: p<.05, b: p<.01, c: p<.001. 
Table 6. Impact of real-time responses to candidate statements on post-debate political attitudes by political knowledge. 
 Low knowledge  High knowledge 
 R2 Min, R2 candidate 
statements 
 R2 Min. R2 candidate 
statements 
% EU most appropriate level to solve most pressing problem 0.303 0.183  0.482 0.047 
Development of economic situation of the EU 0.520 0.102  0.598 0.025 
Expected development of economic situation of the EU 0.508 0.121  0.638 0.045 
Comparison of the economic situation in Germany and the EU 0.344 0.085  0.546 0.026 
Responsibility of EU for economic situation in Germany 0.521 0.031  0.579 0.021 
Financial support of suffering member states 0.493 0.133  0.620 0.078 
Trust EU 0.570 0.280  0.618 0.078 
Trust European Commission 0.495 0.336b  0.583 0.003 
EU good thing 0.600 0.042  0.796 0.019 
Further integration 0.644 0.008  0.589 0.007 
Fear 0.551 0.136  0.569 0.016 
Anger 0.676 0.080  0.313 0.018 
Hope 0.299 0.166  0.334 0.039 
Joy 0.269 0.123  0.505 0.036 
Disgust 0.616 0.137  0.635 0.028 
Contempt 0.094 0.047  0.499 0.060 
N 31  79 
Notes: All models include pretest value of the dependent variable, ideology, gender, and real-time responses for the 
five candidates; a: p<.05, b: p<.01, c: p<. 001. 
of the real-time responses to candidate statements 
tends to be higher for voters with a low level of political 
knowledge than for knowledgeable voters (see Table 6). 
Only in one case—trust in the European Commission—is 
the difference in minimum R2 large enough to reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance. 
In sum, the relationship between the evaluation of 
the candidates’ messages and EU attitudes is not as 
strong as expected. In most cases, the sign of the re-
gression coefficients indicates that support for the 
candidates increases favorable opinions about the EU. 
Although our final analysis shows that political ‘novic-
es’ tend to be more persuaded by candidate messages 
than political ‘experts’, the differences measured are 
statistically significant in only one instance. Interesting-
ly enough, this conditional impact affects a variable at 
the center of the Eurovision debate: trust in the Euro-
pean Commission. 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
In 2014, the EP election campaign was characterized by 
the introduction of a new campaign format: a televised 
debate between candidates running for the presidency 
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of the European Commission. Based on the vast body 
of research on TV debates in the domestic context, we 
developed the expectation that exposure to the Euro-
vision debate would lead to a shift in attitudes on the 
EU. Based on a quasi-experiment among German stu-
dents we found that viewers of the debate tended to 
respond positively to what the candidates had to say. 
In addition, we were able to demonstrate that re-
spondents changed a (small) sub-set of their EU-related 
attitudes due to debate exposure. Although it seems 
plausible that shifts in political attitudes are connected 
to evaluations of candidate messages, the observed re-
lationships are not very strong. One tentative explana-
tion for the weak relationship between candidate 
statements and attitude change is that the participants 
of our study might not perceive each message as 
equally salient. Unfortunately, our data does not allow 
us to differentiate between the relative importance re-
spondents attach to individual reactions. Still, most of 
the effects we found indicate that positive evaluations 
of the candidates’ messages result in more favorable 
attitudes towards the EU. However, our results do not 
indicate whether the measured effects are indicative of 
a reinforcement of already existing pro-European atti-
tudes, or if some EU-skeptical recipients were actually 
persuaded by the candidates’ messages. Nevertheless, 
the general finding that our recipients displayed more 
positive attitudes towards the EU ties in well with pre-
vious findings in TV debate research. 
Another goal of this contribution was to analyze 
whether the recipients’ political expertise influenced 
the perception and the impact of the debate. We 
found no major and systematic differences between 
political ‘novices’ and political ‘experts’ with respect to 
information processing, direct debate effects, and the 
link between spontaneous reactions to what the can-
didates said and EU attitudes. One explanation for the 
often small and statistically insignificant differences be-
tween ‘novices’ and ‘experts’ can be linked to the small 
sample size. Moreover, the inconclusiveness of the 
moderating impact of knowledge on the perception 
and the effects of the debate might result from the ob-
servation that the processing of debate content is 
much more complex than what can be captured by our 
models. In particular, we assume that not only is what 
the candidates say important for voters but also how 
the messages are verbalized. This might indicate that 
debate strategy matters. 
While most of our findings suggest that the moder-
ating role of political knowledge for the impact of the 
Eurovision debate as a major campaign message is lim-
ited, our results also underscore an important observa-
tion made by previous research in this field: the effect 
of political involvement varies with the dependent var-
iable in focus (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011; Lecheler et 
al., 2009). One of the main results we thus draw from 
this analysis is that we consider the often-claimed dif-
ferences between voters with low and high levels of 
political knowledge to be exaggerated. This is in line 
with other findings from debate research in the Ger-
man context (Reinemann & Maurer, 2010). 
In sum, our findings highlight that televised debates 
in the run-up to the 2014 EP election can affect the at-
titudes of voters. Although our results do not provide a 
final and conclusive answer to the question about the 
impact of political knowledge on the likelihood of atti-
tudinal change, our general finding suggests that the 
observed attitudinal shift leads to more positive evalu-
ations of the EU. Hence, EU pundits should press for 
keeping this debate format for future elections. A pre-
requisite to achieving massive effects is, of course, that 
large parts of the electorate watch Eurovision debates. 
Based on the experiences of the 2014 election there is 
ample scope to improve the attractiveness of this cam-
paign event.  
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Appendix. Question wording and coding. 
EU most appropriate level to solve most pressing problem: “What do you think would be the most appropriate level to 
deal with those three problems that you have just mentioned?”; “European level” (1), “National level” (0), 
“Regional/local level” (0). 
Development of the economic situation of the EU: “Thinking about the economy in the European Union as a whole, 
would you say that over the past year the economy in the EU…”; “has improved by much” (2), “has improved 
somewhat” (1), “stayed about the same” (0), “got somewhat worse” (-1), “got much worse” (-2). 
Expected development of the economic situation of the EU: “What about the next 12 months? Do you expect the econ-
omy, in the European Union as a whole,…”; “to get much better” (2), “to get somewhat better” (1), “to stay 
about the same” (0), “to get somewhat worse” (-1), “to get much worse” (-2). 
Comparison of the economic situation in Germany and the EU: “If you compare the state of the economy in your coun-
try with the European Union as a whole, would you say the state of the economy in your country is…”; “much 
better than in the EU” (2), “somewhat better than in the EU” (1), “about the same as in the EU” (0), “some-
what worse than in the EU” (-1), “much worse than in the EU” (-2). 
Responsibility of the EU for economic situation in Germany: “What do you think—to what extent is each of the following 
institutions responsible for the economic conditions in your country?” The EU; 11-point scale from -5 (“not at 
all responsible”) to +5 (“fully responsible”). 
Financial support for economically depressed member states “Do you agree or disagree that in times of crisis countries 
that are better off should give financial help to another EU member state facing severe economic and financial 
difficulties?”; “totally agree” (3), “agree” (2), “disagree” (1), “totally disagree” (0). 
EU good thing: “Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European Union is a good 
thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?”; “good thing” (1), “neither good nor bad” (0), “bad thing” (-1). 
Further integration: “Some say European integration (i.e. the economic and political cooperation between the member 
states) should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. And what is your opinion on this is-
sue?” 11-point scale from +5 (“European integration should be pushed further”) to -5 (“European integration 
has already gone too far“). 
Trust in EU: “How much of the time do you think you can trust the following groups and institutions to do what is right? 
The European Union”; “almost always” (2), “frequently” (1), “about half of the time” (0), “once in a while” (-1), 
“almost never” (-2). 
Trust in EU Commission: “How much of the time do you think you can trust the following groups and institutions to do 
what is right? The European Commission”; “almost always” (2), “frequently” (1), “about half of the time” (0), 
“once in a while” (-1), “almost never” (-2). 
Fear: “If you think about the European Union: To what extent does the EU trigger fear in you? Fear”, 7-point scale from 
-3 (“not at all”) to +3 (“to a great extend”). 
Anger: “If you think about the European Union: To what extent does the EU trigger anger in you? Anger”, 7-point scale 
from -3 (“not at all”) to +3 (“to a great extend”). 
Hope: “If you think about the European Union: To what extent does the EU trigger hope in you? Hope”, 7-point scale 
from -3 (“not at all”) to +3 (“to a great extend”). 
Joy: “If you think about the European Union: To what extent does the EU trigger joy in you? Joy”, 7-point scale from -3 
(“not at all”) to +3 (“to a great extend”). 
Disgust: “If you think about the European Union: To what extent does the EU trigger disgust in you? Disgust”, 7-point 
scale from -3 (“not at all”) to +3 (“to a great extend”). 
Contempt: “If you think about the European Union: To what extent does the EU trigger contempt in you? Contempt”, 7-
point scale from -3 (“not at all”) to +3 (“to a great extend”). 
Political knowledge: “For each of the following statements about the EU, please mark whether you think they are true 
or false: “The EU currently consists of 28 member states” (true), “The members of the European Parliament 
are directly elected by the citizens of each member state” (true), “Norway is a member of the EU” (false). 
Based on the answers to these statements a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (“none of the statements were an-
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swered correctly”) to 3 (“all statements were answered correctly”) was calculated. For some analyses the scale 
was dichotomized into “low political knowledge/political novices” (i.e., none or one statement correctly an-
swered) (0) vs. “high political knowledge/political experts” (i.e., two or three statements correctly answered) 
(1). 
Ideology: “In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. What is your position?” 11-point scale from 0 
(“left”) to 10 (“right”). 
Gender: male (0), female (1). 
 
